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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

RECENT CASES
CRIMINAL LAW-MURDER IN THE FIRST DEGREE IN THE PERPETRATION OF FELONIES-DEFINITION OF THE FELONIES:' In every
trial for murder based upon the felony-murder in the first degree doctrine,?
the trial judge is faced with the duty of defining the felonies enumerated in the
statute. For the sake of convenience, the possible definitions of the felonies can
be classified into two groups: common law and statutory. Which definition
should the trial judge use?
In an excellent note in 43 DICKINSON LAW REVIEW 194, Thomas L. Myers
reviews the trend of the cases up to 1939. The purpose of this note is merely
to bring that discussion up to date.
The logical rule would appear to be that where a Penal Code uses a term
which is defined in the same Code, that definition is the one to prevail. That
is the holding of Commonwealth v. Maloney.3 In that case a homicide occurred
in the perpetration of a robbery and burglary. The jury returned a verdict of
guilty of murder in the first degree. The defendant excepted to the court's
charge to the jury because in defining the term burglary to the jury, the trial
judge defined it as it was defined under the Penal Code of June 24, 1939,
P. L. section 901, 18 P. S. § 4901: "Whoever, at any time, wilfully and maliciously,
enters any building, with intent to commit any felony therein, is guilty of burglary."
This definition which the Supreme Court affirmed is much broader than its
common law definition. The defense relied upon Commonwealth v. Exler.4 In that
case the defendant had sexual intercourse with a girl 121/2 years old. Due to the
resulting injuries and shock, the girl died. No evidence of lack of consent was
presented. Lack of consent being the important element of common law rape, the
defendant was not guilty of such a crime. In understanding the court's disposition
of this case, it is important to note the time and sequence of the passage of
the statutes involved in this case. The Penal Code of 18605 contained the definition
of common law rape. The so-called "statutory rape" statute was not passed until
18876 when the felony of rape was extended to include consensual intercourse
with a girl under 16. In the Exler case, the court concluded that a killing in the
perpetration of "statutory rape" was not murder in the first degree because
so to hold would be to extend by implication and without express amendment,
the penalty of thL section of the Code of 1860 defining murder in the first
1 For an excellent and thorough treatment of this subject see the note at 43 DcK. L. REV. 194 by
Thomas L. Myers.
2 Act of June 24. 1939, P. L. 872, 18 P. S. 4704.
8 365 Pa. 1, 73 A.2d 707 (1950).
4 243 Pa. 155, 89 A. 968 (1914).
5 Section 91 of Penal Code of March 31, 1860, P. L. 382, 18 P. S. § 2261.
6 Act of May 19, 1887, P. L. 128, 18 P. S. § 2261.
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degree to an offense created and defined by a subsequent statute. It is often pointed
out that in the course of its opinion in the Exler case the court makes the statement
that the term rape as used in the Penal Code of 1860 means common law rape.
As capably explained by Mr. Myers in his article, since the statutory definition
of rape under the 1860 Penal Code and its common law definition are substantially
the same, and since the term "common law rape" is frequently used to differentiate it from the newer "statutory rape," the court's labeling the crime
according to its common law definition is not convincing.
Which course have the cases followed since the adoption of the Penal Code
of 1939? There is dicta in Commonwealth v. Neil 7 to the effect that " the term
'rape' as used in the murder statute is limited to rape at common law and does
not include statutory rape." Standing alone, this statement would appear to indicate that the common law definition of the felonies is to prevail. But as this
isonly dicta and the case can be explained as a misinterpretation of Commonwealth
v. Exler and in view of the most recent cases pronouncement on the subject, it
is of doubtful authority for the topic under discussion.
In Commonwealth v. Darcyg the defendant was convicted of murder in the
first degree for having killed the victim in the perpetration of robbery. The trial
court did not explain to the jury "that the term 'robbery' as used in the first degree murder statute means common law robbery.'' 9 But the court goes on to point
out that the Penal Code nowhere defines robbery so that by necessity its definition
is according to the common law. The court also points out that the d-efendant
was clearly guilty of common law robbery and as no issue was raised during the
trial, the trial court's omission to define the crime was not error.
In Commonwealth v. Darcy," the defendant was convicted of murder in the
first degree for a homicide resulting in the attempt to perpetrate robbery. The
def'endant relied upon the following argument: that only by the common law
is murder defined in Pennsylvania, that the Criminal Code of 1860 makes nothing
murder that was not murder before; that when Pennsylvania was first settled, an
accidental killing was not murder unless it occurred as the proximate result of and
during or in connection with the commission of a felony; that a bare attempt
to rob was not then a felony although such attempt had been made a felony
by Statute 7 George II, c. 21 (1735); and, therefore, that the necessary ingredients
of murder were not proved. The court answered this with the well-settled rule that
an unintentional homicide in the commission or attempted commission of a
felony such as rape, burglary, or robbery was murder at common law. The court also
points out, without assenting to the claim of the defense that an attempt to rob
was not a felony at common law, that it was made a felony by section 102 of the
362 Pa. 507 (1949).
8 362 Pa. 259 (1949).
9 At page 277.
:0 341 Pa. 305, 19 A.2d 98 (1941).
7
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Criminal Codt of 1860.11 This, it is submitted, strengthens the conclusion that
the court intends the statutory definition of the felony to prevail. For does not
the court imply that it suffices that the attempt to commit robbery is made a felony
by statute?
Should the point ever be squarely presented whether murder in the prepetration
of "statutory rape" is murder in the first degree, just what course the court will
take is not yet clear. The dicta in Commonwealth v. Neill based upon Commonwealth v. Exler should no longer prevail for the basis of its conclusion, namely,
the objection to extending the punishment of a crime in the Penal Code of
1860 to a new crime created in 1887, is no longer valid.
It is submitted that the only rule supported by the cases on point and the
rule dictated by reason is that a word or phrase, the meaning of which is clear
in one section of an act, will be construed to mean the same thing in another
section of the same act. 1'
Emanuel A. Cassimatis
11 18 P. S. § 2891.
12 Bonomo Unemployment Compensation Case. 161 Pa. Super., 622, 56 A.2d 288 (1948).
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SPECIFIC ENFORCEMENT OF CONTRACTS TO LOAN MONEYRULE OF ROGERS V. CHALLIS MODIFIED: In the recent decision of City
of Camden v. South Jersey Port Commission,' the Supreme Court of New Jersey
approved an action of the New Jersey Superior Court, Chancery Division, ordering
specific performance of a contract to lend money. 2 The decision, in which the
Court followed the precendent-breaking Columbus Club v. Simons3 and a prior
New Jersey case 4 along the same lines, marks the most radical departure to date
from the once unbending Rule of Rogers v. Challis5 that mere executory contracts
to borrow or lend money, with or without security, are not specifically enforceable in equity for the reason that there is an adequate remedy at law. In a lucid
and carefully reasoned opinion written by Chief Justice Vanderbilt, the New
Jersey Court recognized the over-all propriety of the general rule, first laid
down by Sir John Romilly, in 1859, but modified it by asserting that, "where the circumstances are such that specific performance is the only method by which
relief can be granted, it is well within the power of the court so to order." s
The writer feels the corollary to be a proper one and, further, in view of the
peculiar facts presented in the City of Camden case, to have been by the Court
happily applied, although he also feels that the Court might have been more
accurate in assigning reasons for its action.
The City of Camden case grew out of a contractual dispute between the City
of Camden, a muncipial corporation, and the South Jersey Port Commission,
a public corporation created to govern the South Jersey Port District, with power
to "determine upon the location, type, size and construction of requisite port
facilities," as well as to "lease, * * * construct, make, equip, and maintain
port facilities in the district." 7 In pursuance of this power and authority, the Port
Commission decided to construct a pier and warehouse on the Camden waterfront, the benefits of which would accrue solely to the City of Camden. By special
statute,8 the Commission was authorized to enter into a contract with the City
of Camden under the terms of which that muncipality would lend to the Port
Commission the sums necessary for financing the project, the money to be first
raised by a special tax approved by the voters in a general referendum. The loan
to the Port Commission was to be payable in annual installments of .a stipulated
amount, but, in reliance on future payments of these instaliments, the Commission
was authorized to issue a series of 4% bonds to obtain immediate working capital,
I - N. J. Eq. - , 73 A.2d 55 (1950).
2 2 N. J. Super. 278, 63 A.2d 552 (1948).
S 110 Okla. 48, 236 P. 12, 41 A. L. R. 350 (Sup. Ct. 1925).
4 Jacobsen v. First National Bank of Blocmingdale, 129 N. J. Eq. 440, 20 A.2d

19

(Ch.

1941), aff. 130 N. J. Eq. 604, 23 A.2d 409 (E & A. 1942).
5 27 Beav. 175, 54 Eng. Rep. 68, 18 Eng. Rul. Cas. 278 (1859); see WILLISTON, CONTACS,
1421; 5 POMaRoY'S EQ 2175.

6

73 A.2d

55, 63.

7 P. L. 1926, Chapter 336, R. S. 12:11.1 et seq., N. J. S. A.

8 P. L. 1928, Chapter 64, R. S. 12:11-26 to 39, N.

J.

S. A.
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these bonds, however, to be the sole obligations of the Port Commission
rather than of the contracting municipality.
The tax for supporting the project having been approved at a general
election, the City of Camden and the Port Commission entered into an agreement
by which the City agreed, to make the advances authorized, the advances to extend
over a 25 year period, and the Commission in turn agreed to repay the advances
and the interest thereon out of the profits to be derived by it from the proposed
port facilities. In reliance on this agreement, the Commission floated the bond
issue and with the funds obtained from the sale thereof commenced construction
of the pier and warehouse. The City, on its part, levied the approved tax and
made the stipulated advances until September 1, 1946, when it refused the Commission further funds, apparently because the City felt it was not receiving benefits commensurate with its contributions. After first commencing and discontinuing an action at law against the City for breach of the loan contract, the
Port Commission then filed the action in question for specific enforcement
by way of an equitable counterclaim to an action by the City seeking from the
Commission an accounting in equity on another unsuccessful transaction to
which Port and City had been parties.
In meeting the Commission's counterclaim, the City filed a number of
defenses, all of which eventually proved unsuccessful, but the only one pertinent
to the present discussion was that in which the City contended that, since its contract with the Commission was a mere' executory loan agreement, under the
Rule of Rogers v. Challis the Commission was relegated for its remedy to an
action for damages at law. This contention the New Jersey Court met foursquare. And, in granting the Commission's counterclaim, they repudiated the
Rule of Rogers v. Challis, at least in so far as it was to be regarded as universally
binding, calmly and without equivocation, by saying that executory loan contracts,
like any other type of contract, were specifically enforcible in equity if there
was no adequate remedy at law. In making its decision, the Court relied on two
cases, but neither of them, as will appear presently, was in any way nearly so
decisive as was the ruling of the City of Camden Court itself.
In Columbus Club v. Simons, 110 Okia. 48, 236 Pac. 12, 41 A. L. R. 350
(1925), for the first time in nearly three quarters of a century, a court of appellate
jurisdiction gave careful consideration to the Rogers v. Challis holding. And
after a case-by-case analysis of the leading authorities, the Oklahoma Court decided that, in certain extraordinary instances, the Rule did not apply. But, and
this is not to detract from the judiciousness of the Oklahoma decision, the
Columbus case involved an action to compel a mortgagee, who had already taken
his mortgage as security, to follow through on his promise to make the petitioner
a loan. And, after first deciding that certain executory loan contracts were enforceable in equity as such, the Oklahoma Court took great pains to buttress
its decision by emphasizing that the same decision could be and was reached
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on the particular facts before them, because the case was analagous to one by
a vendor of realty for specific performance by a vendee of his contract to purchase the vendor's land.
Jacobsen et. al. v. First National Bank of Bloomingdale et. al., 129 N. J.

Eq. 440, 20 A. 2d. 19 (Ch. 1941), a/f. 130 N. J. Eq. 604, 23 A. 2d. 409 (E. &
A. 1942), the other case cited as authority by Chief Justice Vanderbilt in his
opinion, while in accord with the City of Camden decision and, too, in tones
less equivocal than those of Columbus Club v. Simons, still found the court
hedging its conclusion by citing other grounds therefor. The complainants in
that case had negotiated and obtained a loan from the defendant bank through
a concern known as the Mortgage Bureau, giving their mortgage as security
for their note. The Mortgage Bureau had received the money from the bank in
the form of checks made out to the complainants but had forged the complainants' signatures thereto and appropriated the funds themselves. The complainants brought a bill in equity asking that the bank be restrained in proceeding
against them on the mortgage or note, or that the mortgage and note be cancelled
or reduced in amount, or that the bank be ordered to specifically perform
its loan agreement with the complainants by issuing new checks to replace those
forged and cashed by the absconded agent. The Court felt that unless specific
performance were granted the complainants, they would be in the impossible
position of having on their hands an unfinished house (the original loan had been
obtained for the purpose of completing the house), against which was the
lien of the bank's first mortgage, and which house would not be adequate
security for any further loan by another party. Therefore, because the remedy
at law was obviously inadequate, the Court ordered the bank to specifically
perform its contract, even though, under the Rule of Rogers v. Challis, the remedy
would not have been available. But the court also emphasized that since the object
of the complainants' bill was to restrain the defendant from further proceeding on
outstanding writings, which writings were apparently correct on their face though
actually representing a considerably smaller claim, the bill was actually one in
the nature of a bill quia timet, over which equity had inherent jurisdiction, which
gave the court additional basis for its decree.
From a consideration of the cases just discussed, therefore, it is apparent
that the City of Camden decision represents the first absolute break yet taken 9
from the Rogers v. Challis Rule. But, as has been emphasized previously, the

writer has no reason to criticize and he does not criticize the court's decision. Un9 In Stewart v. Bounds et. al., 167 Wash. 554, 9 P.2d 1112 (1932), the Washington court
implied that in a proper case they would grant specific performance of an executory loan con.
tract, but the court did not grant specific performance in the case before it; and in Lonergan
v. Highland Trust Co. et al., 287 Mass. 550, 192 N. E. 34 (1934), the Massachusetts court
enforced as of course specific performance of an executory contract for the payment of money
where the legal remedy was inadequate, but without considering the Rule of Rogers v. Challis
in any way.
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fortunately, however, it would seem that the court might have assigned clearer
reasons for making the exception in the particular case involved. Said the court,
in deciding that the particular loan contract between the City of Camden and
the South Jersey Port Commission was specifically enforceable: 10 "If the City
were now to be relieved of its obligations, the entire project would come to a halt
and the rights of the citizens and third parties who had relied upon it would
be irreparably injured, including the rights of the bond holders whose interests
total over $2,400,000."
This statement, of course, was true as far as it went. The question is whether
it was sufficient to support the Court's decision, and the writer feels that it was
not. After all, whether or not a legal remedy is adequate should be decided
primarily from the point of view of the litigants in the action and not from the
standpoint of its effect on the rights of "citizens and third parties" not in any
way privy to the contract in question. What the Court should have emphasized
in its opinion, and what was probably the actual basis of their decision, was
that, from the point of view of the particular complainant, i. e. from the point
of view of the South Jersey Port Commission, an action at law for breach by
the City of its loan contract would have been an entirely frustrating remedy,
in effect no remedy at all. The sole purpose for which the Port Commission was
created, the one object of its existence, was to "construct, make, equip, and
maintain" port facilities. But, unless the Port Commission could obtain funds
from the City of Camden, and that was the sole source available to it under the
statute giving the Commission its mandate, it could carry out none of its functions. The damages available in an action at law would have fallen far short
of the amount necessary to build the pier and warehouse; yet, unless equity
granted its plea for specific enforcement, the Commission had no other resource
at law!
In the final analysis, of course, that the City of Camden Court's opinion contained reasoning which was slightly askew is of only incidental importance. The
point to be most emphasized is that, in City of Camden v. South Jersey Port Commission, for the first, or perhaps the second, 1' time in nearly a century, a court
of final resort looked behind the Rule of Rogers v. Challis and said, without
qualification or citation of secondary theory, that whether or not a contract to loan
money was specifically enforcible depended solely upon whether or not damages
at law were an adequate remedy for its breach; that usually damages were an
adequate remtdy, but that in certain peculiar situations they were not adequate;
and that, in such cases, the other requisites for specific enforcement being present,
a court of equity would decree specific performance just as forthrightly and
just as certainly as they would have done were the contract before them one for
the sale of land or a unique chattel.
10 73 A.2d 55, 63.
11 See note 9, sapra, Lonergan v. Highland Trust Co. et al.
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It is notoriously true that equity, characterized as it is by precise decrees
as contrasted with general verdicts, is prone to dig itself too narrow canyons,
is apt to seize upon an altogether correct decision such as that in Rogers v. Challis
and carry it to heights, and depths, undreamed of by the court of origin. No wonder,
then, that Chancellor Eldon thought, "It is dangerous to define!" But in its
City of Camden decision, the New Jersey Court viewed Rogers v. Challis in its
true perspective. And, though Pennsylvania courts have as yet never been faced
with any case upon this issue, it is to be hoped that, when such an issue does arise
here, Pennsylvania will be guided in its decision by the law of New Jersey.
Thomas P. Monteverde

